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Abstract—Some online communities like Friendster had de-
clined, and some of the others are said to be declining. Recent
research has revealed the mechanism of decline as well as that
of rise in each community. However, no comprehensive research
has yet revealed the difference in declining mechanisms of each
communities. We considered the online communities as networks
of users and topics and defined behavior of users using Heider’s
balance theory. Users in our model are in a dilemma, stuck
between topic preference and the balance between neighboring
users. How the user behaves in the dilemma, his/her strategy,
disseminates to other users. We simulate online communities
using the model and observe the rise and decline of different
kinds of communities. As a result, we found that two types
of communities tend to develop with many users: communities
in which the topic changes dynamically (FreeTopic-type) and
communities in which the topic changes gradually (Topic-type).
However, the property of each community and behavior of users
are different. We found by simulation that the collaborative
behavior of users happens very frequently in the FreeTopic-
type community, in which users consider the balance between
each other rather than their topic preference. As a result, the
FreeTopic-type communities do not often crash (i.e. quickly lose
users). In addition, we confirmed that the postings about a topic
are either negative or positive in the FreeTopic-type community.
On the other hand, in the Topic-type community, simulation
results indicate that users prioritize their preference for a topic.
This causes the community to crash very frequently. However,
users in such a community are found to obtain more benefits
than in FreeTopic-type communities. It can be said that, after
crashes occur, the community is still relatively beneficial for some
users who remain.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONLINE communities and SNS services have becomevery popular. For example, in the USA, 67% of internet
users use Facebook and more than 10% users use twitter and
Pinterest [1]. Online communities demand the new kinds of
media that can allow users to give each other the information
they need [2]. However many communities, even large ones
such as Friendster, have declined [3]. The number of users of
Myspace has been decreasing [4], and some researchers argue
that Facebook, which has more than one-billion active users,
is also declining [5]. It is essential to reveal the mechanism of
the declining process of online communities to stabilize them
because they are of increasing social importance.
Online communities decline in various ways. The declin-
ing processes of Friendster and Myspace have been slower
than their developing processes [5]. However, some content-
oriented communities, such as small communities on YouTube,
decline even more faster [6][7].
To reveal the declining process and estimate future trends,
many models of online communities has been proposed. Most
recently, Cannarella and Spechler have predicted the decline
of Facebook using an irSIR model (recovery SIR model) [5].
They consider the entrance/stay/exit process of an SNS in the
same way as the suspect/infect/recover process of the SIR
model and calculate the probability of transitioning between
states using the actual data. However, many critics, including
a researcher working with Facebook, have argued against
their conclusions because the research does not reveal the
relationship between user behavior and the mechanism of
decline. Other researchers have made a more detailed model
of SNS. Liu et al. classified the users of SNS into four
states: New Joining, Active, Active&Inactive, and Quiet)[8].
They estimate the property of bidirectional transition between
each state and predict the number of users in the community.
Furthermore, other researchers have focused on the developing
process [9][10][11] and declining process [3] by investigating
relationships in the macroscopic evolution of communities.
As shown above, researchers have revealed macroscopic
dynamics of communities. However, the relationship between
such collective dynamics and behavior of users is not clear.
Furthermore, each research is ad-hoc and does not give a
comprehensive interpretation of online communities. Online
communities are very different in scale, network structure,
range of topics, and so on. We thus propose a comprehensive
model that can explain the evolution of a wide variety of com-
munities and simulate the developing and declining processes.
In the model, we focus on the psychological state of users
in a community. For example, researchers say Facebook users
become tired of clicking the Like button, which expresses
approval of other users’ postings [12]. Even if your friend
posts something that does not interest you, you sometimes
push the Like button. In this case, the user is caught in a
dilemma between their lack of interest in a friend’s posting
and the relationship with the friend. When you do not like
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
your friend’s posts, there are three solutions: going along with
your friend, being silent, or giving your opposing opinion.
Such a situation is explained with Heider’s balance theory
[13]. In this theory, the psychological stability between three
objects can estimated in a simple equation so that the three
objects can behave more stably. In the online community,
the three objects are a user, a user’s friend, and a topic.
Heider’s balance theory has been verified in experiments [14]
and improved with some small extensions [15]. Owing to
the simplicity and correctness of model, the theory is used
for describing the mechanism of group formation [16][17],
predicting likes or dislikes between two users in a community
[18], and investigating the process of forming opinions [19].
Thus, we use Heider’s balance theory for describing user
behavior in an online community.
In addition, we take into account the polarization of opinion
in online communities. Cass Sunstein has claimed online com-
munities cannot avoid this polarization without appropriate
rules [20][21]. You can feel a unique atmosphere in online
communities. For example, people talk only positively about
things or only discuss in a serious manner. There are questions
about how user interaction forms the atmosphere, what kind of
conditions impact the formation of an atmosphere, and what
kind of atmosphere is possessed by communities that do not
decline.
We propose a comprehensive agent based model of an
online community that can explain the developing and de-
clining processes. Using the model, we first investigate what
kinds of communities are likely to develop. Second, we
investigate the mechanism of polarization of postings. Finally,
we classify declining processes and estimate the probability
of each process in different conditions (range of topics and
affiliation of opinion).
II. MODEL
WE describe the model of online communities using thenetwork of the users and topics.
Balance theory, which was proposed by Heider in 1956
[13], is the generalization of an equilibrium between a person
and surrounding objects. This theory considers the likes and
dislikes of three objects. The objects can be three people or
two people and a subject. The two attitudes, like or dislike, are
represented by signs of + or - [(Fig.1). Shown in this figure,
when the multiplication of the signs is +, the triangle is stable
and people in the triangle also feel stable. For example, as
shown in the upper half of [Fig.1], triangles composed of a
three ”likes” or two ”dislikes” and one ”like” are stable. The
latter situation means you do not like what your rival likes.
On the other hand, as shown in the lower half of Fig.1, when
the multiplication of the signs is -, the triangle is unstable. For
example, you like what your friend dislikes.
A. User Dilemma in Online Communities
In online communities, users behave in accordance with the
balance of Heider’s triangles and with preferences for different
Fig. 1. Heider’s balance theory. The model is composed of A (Person A), F
(Friend), and T (Topic). The upper and lower rows show stable and unstable
situations.
topics. If these preferences are different, the user is caught in
a dilemma. We make a model that can illustrate this situation.
The balance theory is suitable for online communities
because they are composed of users and topics. Online com-
munities can be described as networks composed of topics and
users (Fig. 2). In this figure, the three topics and seven users
are connected. The edges between users can be described as
the value of + or -. The edges between a user and a topic
mean the user is a participant of the topic and may take the
value of P (post positive), N (post negative), or S (silent).
Fig. 2. Network structure of online community.
Fig. 3. Example of Heider’s triangles related to User A.
A user recognizes all triangles to which he/she belongs. In
Fig.2, user A recognizes the three triangles in the network. The
networks are shown in Fig. 3. User A calculates the balance
of his/her postings, the friend’s posting, and the relationship
with the friend. Thus, if the friend does not post about the
topic, user A does not calculate the balance (right triangle in
Fig.3). User A estimates that he/she can obtain better balance
in the two triangles, P (post positive) or N (Post negative). In
this case, N is the solution in both triangles, so users tend to
post N.
However, a user also considers his/her preference to the
topic. The user’s interest and content of the topic are defined
by L-length bits. A user’s interest and content of topics are
the same length. To represent the conversation in real com-
munities, the L-length bits of a topic change at each step. The
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similarity of both L-length bits means the user’s preference to
a topic. This is defined in Eq.1 using the Kronecker product
in the range -1 to 1.
pr(A; T ) =
PL
i=1 IAIT
L
 2  1 (1)
In Fig.2, user A’s preference to topic T is pr = 0:2(> 0).
Therefore, user A is satisfied when he/she posts positive (P).
However, user A is under pressure to post negative (N) in the
balance of triangles, so he/she is caught in a dilemma. In this
case, he/she has three solutions: post positive (P) to prioritize
the preference to the topic, stay silent (S), or post negative (N)
to prioritize the preference to balance.
B. Strategy in the Dilemma
To generalize the dilemma discussed above, agents are
placed in four states, considering the balance of Heider’s
triangle and preference to topics (in the status section in Table
I). The former is described as + or - corresponding to the
preference to the topic defined in Eq.1. If pr > 0, the state
is + and - in the opposite case. The latter is also described
as + or -. This means which is a better balance in Heider’s
triangles. If P (Post Positive) is better than N (Post Negative),
the state is +. Each user has a strategy corresponding to the
four states. In each state, a user can behave in three ways: P,
S, or N. Therefore, the number of combinations of the strategy
is 34 = 81. The strategies are shown in Table I. For example,
when status = 3, the agent with the NNSP strategy selects (S).
TABLE I
STATUSES (#1-#4) AND EXAMPLES OF STRATEGY.
# 1 2 3 4
Status Preference to topic - - + +
Balance of Triangle - + - +
NNPP Self N N P P
NSPP Self N S P P
SSPP Self S S P P
NNNP Coll N N N P
NSNS Coll N S N S
NSNP Coll N S N P
NSSS Coll N S S S
Strategy NSSP Coll N S S P
NPNP Coll N P N P
NPSP Coll N P S P
NPPP Coll N P P P
SSSS Coll S S S S
SPPP Coll S P P P
NNSN Irra N N S N
NNPN Irra N N P N
NNPS Irra N N P S
NSNN Irra N S N N
The 81 strategies are classified into three groups: selfish
(Self), collaborative (Coll), and irrational (Irra). The agent
with a Coll strategy prioritizes the balance rather than its topic
preference. For example, an agent with an NPNP strategy posts
Positive when it recognizes balanced triangle, even if the agent
has a negative opinion. On the other hand, the agent with a
Self strategy such as NNPP prioritizes its topic preference. For
example, the agent who has an NNPP strategy behaves only on
the basis of its preference to topics. However, a PPNN strategy
is irrational, because the agent with a PPNN strategy will post
(P) in state #1 but post (N) in state #3. These strategies are
classified below.
First, we describe the determination method of a Coll strat-
egy. The order of this strategy is assumed to be N < S < P .
If the strategy of #1 is larger than that of #2 and #3 and that
of #4 is less than that of #2 and #3, the strategy is irrational
(Irra).
Furthermore, the strategies other then Irra are divided into
Self or Coll in the following ways. We define the distance
between two strategy strings as the sum of the distance
between corresponding strings of each state #1 - #4. We
assume the distances of N - S and S - P are 1 and that of N
- P is 2. In addition, we assume the most selfish strategy is
NNPP and the most collaborative one is NPNP. The strategy
that is further from NNPP and closer than to NPNP is the
Self strategy.
The Irra strategy seems to be rare in real communities.
However, we use all 81 strategies to confirm that an Irra strat-
egy is not suitable for any kind of community and that it will
be eliminated within the process of community development.
In the model, agents update the strategy in each step, and the
strategy of an agent who gains many benefits tends to spread.
For example, if the agent who has a Coll strategy gains many
benefits, the Coll strategy will spread and the atmosphere of
the community will be collaborative.
C. Steps
The flow of the model is shown in algorithm 1. First, a
network with agents and topics is constructed. Subsequently,
in each step, agents post, calculate benefit, exit, and update
strategy in a random order. The steps of the model are
described in detail in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Online communities
fInitializationg Making network of topic and agent
while NumberofAgent >= 10 do
for Each Agents by random order do
fStep 1g Posting by strategy
fStep 2g Calculate benefit B
if B < 0 then
fStep 3g Exit Agent
else
fStep 4g Update strategy
end if
end for
fStep 5g Entrance of Agent
fStep 6g Update Topic
end while
1) Initialization: At first, a perfect network with 10 agents
and one topic is constructed. All have strong connections to
each other at the beginning of the community. In this paper, we
consider only one topic and all relationships between agents
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are good (+) for analyzing the fundamental behavior of the
community.
The strategy of an agent is chosen randomly from the 81
strategies in Table I. Each L-length bit of a topic is 0 and
that of an agent is defined as below. Interests of each user are
determined completely at random if deviation is low (dev = 0)
and permanently fixed if deviation is high (dev = 1). Initially,
all bit sequences of all users are 0. Then, all bits of all users
are changed to 1 in probability (1  dev)=2.
2) Step 01 - Posting by Strategy: As defined in Section
II-B, an agent recognizes state #1 - #4 by the topic preference
and the balance of Heider’s triangle and decides its behavior
by its strategy. The behavior is post negative (N), silent (S),
or post positive (P).
3) Step 02 - Calculate Benefit: Agents in a dilemma be-
tween topic preference and balance of Heider’s triangle cannot
gain much benefit. To express the benefit of such situation, we
defined the utility function as below. When an agent posts N
or P, the benefit for the agent is the sum of the benefit from
its posting Bpo and the benefit from its preference Bpr after
subtracting the cost of writing Cpo (Eq.2). If the agent is silent
(S), the benefit is Bpr. Thus, the benefits B for the agent’s
behavior are shown as follows:
B =
(
Bpo +Bpr   Cpo (if agent posts (N or P))
Bpr (if agent silents (S))
(2)
Bpo means the external balance of agent, friend, and topic.
If the agent’s post achieves a balanced triangle, Bpo becomes
higher. First, we describe the definition of Po(A; T ), R(A;F ),
and Nt. Po(A; T ) take the values of -1 (when agent A posts
positive (P) to topic (T)), 0 (when agent is silent (S)) and
1 (when agent posts positive (P)). R(A;F ) take the values
of -1 (when A and F have a bad relationship) and 1 (when
A and F have a good relationship ). In addition, Nt is the
number of triangles to which the agent belongs. Bpo of agent
A is the average of each Heider’s triangle’s balance, which
is a multiplication of posting to the topic Po(A; T ), the
relationship R(A;F ), and Po(F; T ) (Eq. ). For example, if
A belongs to one triangle, in which A posts positive (P) to T
(Po(A; T ) = 1) , A and F have a bad relationship and F posts
positive (P) to T (Po(F; T ) =  1). The benefit of A Bpo is
1 1 1 =  1.
Bpo =
P
triangle Po(A; T )R(A;F ) Po(F; T )
Nt
(3)
Bpr means the internal balance of agent, friend, and topic
(Eq.4). In this case, an agent considers his preference (Eq.1)
for calculating his benefit. In the situation in which the agent
posts negative (N) to a topic which it prefers, we assume that
the agent obtains no benefits except for the cost of writing
 Cpo on average. For this assumption, it is necessary to set
Bpo + Bpr = 0 on average. We assume the Bpr is doubled
in Eq.4. This is because the average preference for topic
(E(Pr(A; T )) = 0:5) in Eq.4 is half of the (P (A; T ) = 1) in
Eq.3 when comparing Eq.4 and Eq.3.
Bpr =
P
triangle Pr(A; T )R(A;F ) Po(F; T )
Nt
 2 (4)
As stated above, if an agent posts P or N, the benefit is the
sum of the external balance calculated from its posting Bpo
and internal balance calculated from its preference Bpr from
subtracting the cost of writing Cpo. If an agent stays silent
(S), the benefit comes from internal balance Bpr.
4) Step 03 - Exit Agent: The agent exits from the commu-
nity when the benefit of past steps Btot (Eq.5) is less than 0.
Btot is not a simple totaling of B. The agent will forget the
benefit of past steps by a constant factor of d. In Eq.5, B(i)
is the benefit in the i step and step is the current step.
Btot =
stepX
i=0
B(i) dstep i (5)
When an agent exits, the edge that contains the agent and the
triangle to which the agent belongs will disappear from the
model.
5) Step 04 - Update Strategy: Each agent updates its strat-
egy to make it similar to that of users who obtain large benefits.
An agent chooses one agent with a probability proportional to
the past benefit (Btot) and imitates its strategy. The previous
strategy is crossed with the strategy of a chosen agent in
accordance with the genetic algorithm (GA). In addition, a
strategy changes 1 bit randomly with a probability of Pm.
This probability means sensitivity to exogenous effects.
6) Step 05 - Entrance of Agent: In this model, agents enter
the community at each step. At every step, four new users enter
the community. All new joiners are connected to the topic. To
reproduce the heavily linked node in the real communities,
they connect to Ad friends in accordance with the BA [23]
model. Users choose Ad agents with a probability proportional
to the number of links that the existing agents already have.
7) Step 06 - Change Topics: If people do not lost interest in
the same topic, the communities will continue for a very long
time. However, the topic is changed by internal and external
effects. To describe this phenomenon in the model, the L-
length bits of a topic will be changed by T bits at each step. All
randomly selected T bits of a topic will change the probability
of 0.5. If T is not the integer, the selected number of bits of a
topic is the sum of the number of T and 1 at the probability of
a fraction less than one. With this, the model reproduces the
dynamics, the balance collapses due to the transition of topics,
and the balance is reconstructed by an agent’s adaptation of
its behavior and strategy.
III. SIMULATION AND VERIFICATION
IN this section, we simulate the community using the modelfor examining whether it exhibits the same behavior of real
online communities.
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A. Parameters and Simulation Conditions
To simulate various types of communities, we observe
the evolution of a community by changing the parameter of
changeable bits of topics at each step T . If T takes a lower
value, the topic changes gradually. Thus, we name this a Topic-
type community. On the other hand, if T takes a higher value,
the topic of the community changes greatly at each step. This
means the agents of a community change the topic easily, so
we name this a FreeTopic-type community.
In this paper, for studying basic behavior of the model, the
number of topics is set at one. Other parameters are shown in
Table II.
The deviation of user interest dev is set to 0.1 considering
online communities in the real world. This is because users
in the real online communities such as LinkedIn, Facebook,
and Myspace specify their age, nationality, and academic
qualifications in addition to their interests. [24].
TABLE II
FIXED PARAMETERS OF SIMULATION
Parameter Value
T
Transition of topics
(Changable bits of topic at each step) Variable(1-15)
dev Deviation of user interest 0.125
Adegree Average connecting ratio 12
Cw Cost of Writting 0.07
Uadd Number of users added at step 4
d Decay ratio of past benefit 0:75
Pmutation Mutation ratio of strategy 0.01
B. Example of Simulation Results
We simulate the model under the conditions defined above
and observe the process of rise and decline of communities.
The simulation results are shown in Figs.4 and 5, where the
horizontal axis shows the step from the start and the vertical
axis is the number of agents.
As shown in Figs.4 and 5, the rise and decline of a
community is observed under the conditions of T = 1 and
T = 15. In addition, the number of agents under the condition
of T = 1 (Topic-type) seems to have larger variations than that
of T = 15 (FreeTopic-type). We will verify their mechanisms
in the next section.
The distribution of the number of posts is shown in Figs.6(
T = 1) and 7( T = 15). The horizontal axis indicates the
number of postings and the vertical axis indicates the number
of corresponding users. The distributions of the posting counts
follow power-low distribution, which is observed in real online
communities [25]?
C. Elimination of Irrational Strategy
Users who have an irrational strategy (Irra), defined in Table
I, are considered to be uncommon in real communities. We
confirm that an irrational strategy (Irra) is not suitable for a
community by the following simulation. We observe the ratio
of an agent that has an irrational strategy (Irra) through the
entire step as the topics T transition from 1 to 15 by 0.5. In
Fig. 4. The evolution of online community under the condition of T = 1
(Topic-type)
Fig. 5. The evolution of online community under the condition of T = 15
(FreeTopic-type)
Fig. 6. Distribution of the number of postings of agents under the condition
of T = 1 (Topic-Type)
Fig. 7. Distribution of the number of postings of agents under the condition
of T = 15 (FreeTopic-type).
the results, the average ratio of an Irra strategy is 34  38%.
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The ratio of an Irra strategy is relatively low considering the
percentage of the Irra strategy, 61=81 = 75%, in the initial
users and users added at each step.
Fig. 8. Ratio of Irra strategy agents to all strategy agents
The users of Irra are considered to change their strategy or
exit, since they cannot gain much benefit. In the real world,
the proportion of the people who use such a strategy cannot
be high. Thus, the model can illustrate the selection process
of eccentric users.
According to the results above, this model based on balance
theory reproduces the rise and decline of communities without
cessation of adding new users or the explicit mechanism of
losing interest. Power distribution of the number of users and
the elimination of irrational strategy are characteristics of a
real community.
IV. RISE AND DECLINE OF COMMUNITY
TO investigate the development and decline in differenttypes of communities, we observe the communities’
evolution process through changing the transition of topics
T . The lower value T is a Topic-type community, such as
a bulletin-board system for an exclusive community, and the
higher value of T means a FreeTopic-type community, such
as Facebook and Myspace.
In this chapter, we simulate the evolution process of com-
munities through the entire step by changing the transition of
topics T from 1 to 15 by 0.5. We did not simulate under the
condition of T = 0, because the topics is not fixed to a specific
one in real communities.
A. Average Number of Users and Duration of Community
First, we observe the average number of users and the
duration of a community in a single simulation by changing
the transition of topics T from 1 to 15 by 0.5. The duration
is the number of steps between the first and final steps. The
first step is defined as the step in which there are more than
10 users. A single simulation is finished when there are fewer
than 10 users. The results are shown in Fig.9. In this figure,
the horizontal axis indicates transition of topics T , and the
vertical axes indicate duration (left) and the number of users
(right).
Fig. 9. Duration of communities and average number of postings per step.
T is set from 1 to 15
When the transition of topics is high (T = 15) or low
(T = 1), the duration of community becomes long and
the average number of postings becomes high (Fig.9). The
results show that there are two different conditions for growth
of a community. This means the Topic-type (T = 1) and
FreeTopic-type (T = 15) communities tend to exist over a
long period.
B. Decline of Community
Subsequently, we observe the decline of a community
with changes in the parameters of transition of topic T . In
the preceding analysis, the two types of community, Topic-
type or FreeTopic-type, both have a chance to grow large.
We investigate the decline process of both types below. To
investigate the decline process, we use two indexes: the ratio of
the number of postings after / before peak and the probability
of a crash. The peak is defined as the step that has the highest
number of topics through all steps. When there are more than
two steps that have the highest number of topics, the peak step
is the last one.
1) Continuity of Community After Peak: We observe the
ratio of the number of postings after and before the peak
with changes in the transition of topics T from 1 to 15 by
0.5. The results are shown in Fig. 10, where the horizontal
axis indicates the transition of topics T , and the vertical axis
indicates the ratio of postings after and before the peak.
Fig. 10. Ratio of postings after / before peak
As shown in Fig.10, as the transition of topic T becomes
larger, the ratio of postings after and before the peak becomes
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
smaller. This means the Topic-type communities last longer
than FreeTopic-type communities.
2) Probability of Crashes: Online communities occasion-
ally lose many users in a short period. The causes are
exogenous factors, such as server errors and holiday periods
[26], and endogenous factors. We investigate the probability
of endogenous factors of crashes by changing the transition of
topic T .
A crash is defined as the number of users decreasing to
less than half or 70% within 10 or 20 steps. We investigate
the probability of crash in one simulation step by changing
parameter T from 1 to 15 (Fig.11).
Fig. 11. Probability of crashes
As shown in Fig.11, in each four definitions of probability
of a crash, the community with lower T (Topic-type) suffers
crashes with high frequency. As the T becomes larger, proba-
bility of crash mostly becomes smaller under the condition of
T = 3.
The above analysis clarifies that the Topic-type community
and FreeTopic-type community both have a chance to grow
large. However, the processes of decline are different. The
Topic-type community has large amount of postings after a
peak in spite of highly frequent crashes. Two questions remain
in the results: 1) Why do the Topic-type and FreeTopic-type
communities have different decline processes? 2) Why do
topic-type communities continue long after a peak in spite
of frequent crashes? In the next section, we analyze the
mechanism of evolution of these communities.
V. THE MECHANISM OF RISE AND DECLINE OF
TOPIC-TYPE AND FREETOPIC-TYPE COMMUNITIES
TO investigate the difference between the decline pro-cesses of Topic-type and FreeTopic-type communities,
we compare the distribution, selection of strategy, and the
average benefit of agents of the Coll, Self, and Irra strategies.
As a result, in FreeTopic-type communities, the concentra-
tion of strategies occurs and agents stably gain benefits from
the community. This lead to infrequent crashes. Furthermore,
the average benefits of agents are larger in Topic-type com-
munities than in FreeTopic-type communities, leading to the
longer life of Topic-type communities in spite of their highly
frequent crashes.
A. Concentration of Strategy and Stability of Community
In the model, the agent chooses its behavior by its strategy
in the dilemma of the balance of Heider’s triangles and topic
preference. There are 81 strategies divided into three types:
selfish (Self), collaborative (Coll), and irrational (Irra). We
investigate the distribution of these three strategy types by
the transition of topics T . The ratio of Self strategies to Self
and Coll strategies is plotted in Fig.12.
Under the condition of less transition of topic T , the ratio of
agents who have Self strategies is relatively higher (Fig.12).
Agents with a Self strategy, which means they choose their
behavior on the basis of topic preference, are eliminated under
the condition of a larger transition of topic T . It is considered
that the neighbor’s postings dynamically change step by step
and the balance of Heider’s triangle is easily broken at each
step. On the other hand, in the Topic-type community, the
balance of Heider’s triangle of agents who have a Self strategy
is not easily broken.
Fig. 12. Ratio of Self strategies to Self and Coll strategies
Subsequently, we investigate the concentration of strategies.
The ratio of the top five selected strategies among all 81
strategies that have a higher ratio for the entire term is
calculated by changing the transition of topic T = 1; 8; 15.
In Fig.13, the vertical axis shows the ratio of top N strategies
among all 81 strategies.
As shown in Fig.12, in the FreeTopic-type community
(larger transition of topic T ), the certain strategies tend to
predominate. In the community with middle-level transition
of topic T = 8, the ratio of the concentration of strategies is
also relatively high.
To summarize the analysis above, the ratio of selfish strate-
gies (Self) is relatively higher in the Topic-type community,
though diverse types of strategies remain. On the other hand,
in the FreeTopic-type community, the agents are selected that
use certain strategies but not Self strategies. It could be said
that, in the FreeTopic-type community, agents collaborate by
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Fig. 13. The ratio of top N strategies among all strategies in a single
simulation
considering the balance of Hider’s triangle with their neigh-
bors. This represents the process of a real online community
in which the users cooperate with others and maintain their
relationships by withholding what they want to post or offering
an opinion they do not actually hold.
The benefits of agents are considered to be stable in the
FreeTopic-type communities because certain strategies make
up most selected strategies. In such situations, larger amounts
of agents prioritize collaboration while neglecting their topic
preference. Accordingly, they do not frequently change their
posting behavior to the community and the frequency of
crashes is low.
B. Average Benefits for Agents
We compare the average benefits of agents in Topic-type and
FreeTopic-type communities or the entire period by changing
the transition of topic T . The results are shown in the Fig.15,
where the horizontal axis indicates the transition of topic T
and the vertical axis indicates the average benefit of agents
through the entire period.
Fig. 15. Average benefit of agents
As shown in Fig.15, as the transition of topics T becomes
larger, the average benefit becomes smaller. In Topic-type
communities, the ratio of selfish users is relatively high
(Fig.12). It is considered that agents tend to post considering
their preference and that the positive/negative tendencies of
neighborhood postings do not change dynamically due to low
transition of topics. Thus, the agent obtains many benefits from
its posting Bpo and the benefit from its preference Bpr.
The results in the preceding section show the Topic-type
community continues for a relatively long period after the peak
in spite of highly frequent crashes. This long life is considered
to be due to the many benefits for agents (Fig.15) and the
diversity of strategies (Fig.13). Even if communities crash
and neighborhoods exit from communities, some agents obtain
more benefits and remain. This tendency can be observed in
Fig.4. As shown in Fig.4, in the Topic-type community, some
agents remain after a crash and the community rises again.
On the other hand, in a FreeTopic-type community, agents
obtain relatively fewer benefits (Fig.15) and certain strategies
predominate. The low ratio of postings after the peak (Fig.10)
can be explained as follows: if some agents exit the commu-
nity, a large number of neighborhood agents, which have the
same strategies, lose the benefit of the balance of Heider’s
triangle. Therefore, the neighborhood agents are likely to exit
subsequently.
The reason for relatively fewer benefits in FreeTopic-type
communities is conflict between agent’s topic preference and
the balance of Heider’s triangles. There is a large cluster of
certain strategies, and agents behave considering the balance of
Heider’s triangles rather than their topic preference. Therefore,
the agent obtains benefits from its posting Bpo in spite of the
few benefits from its preference Bpr
VI. DEVIATION OF POSTING FOR THE TOPIC
THE above analysis reveals that the mechanism of the riseand fall of a community differs between the Topic-type
and FreeTopic-type communities. In this section, we inves-
tigate agents’ posts in the community, especially focusing on
the deviation towards negative/positive postings. In real online
communities, participants’ posts sometimes deviate towards
negative/positive. The reason for the deviation is considered
to be that the strategy to post only negative/positive is spread
or that many users who only post negative/positive stay in the
community.
To investigate the probability of the occurrence of the
deviation of posting, we observe the ratio of positive posts
in a single simulation by changing the transition of topics
T = 1; 8; 15 (Fig. 14). In Fig.14, the vertical axis indicates the
ratio of positive posts and horizontal axis indicates transition
of topic T .
As shown in Fig.14(a), the ratio of positive posting is close
to 0.5 under the condition of T = 1. In such a community,
agents post the same amount of negative and positive postings
in a single simulation. On the other hand, as the transition of
topics T becomes larger, the ratio of positive postings inclines
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(a) Transition of topics T = 1 (b) Transition of topics T = 8 (c) Transition of topics T = 15
Fig. 14. Distribution of the ratio of positive posts through a single simulation under the condition of transition of topics T = 1; 8; 15
to 0 or 1. This means the FreeTopic-type community tends to
be composed of only positive/negative posts for the topic.
The reason for deviation towards positive postings is that
the strategy by which agents tend to post positive things
spreads in the community. In this situation, the agents post
only positive posts and the benefit from their postings Bpo
(Eq.2) remains stable. The same explanation is suitable for
cases of the deviation towards negative postings.
The reason for large deviation of postings under the con-
dition of large T can be considered to be the result of
group adaptation. In such situations, the benefit from an
agent’s preference Bpr is unstable because the topic changes
dynamically. The strong cluster of agents, who only post
positive/negative things, stably benefit from their postings Bpo.
This is considered to the best way to survive in such situations.
According to the above results, the deviation towards nega-
tive/positive postings is more likely to occur in the FreeTopic-
type community. In such a community, going along with
neighborhoods is a good method for staying in the community.
As a result, postings for the topic deviate towards negative/-
positive. The model shows that peer pressure tends to spread
widely in the FreeTopic-type community.
VII. CONCLUSION
WE proposed a model on the basis of balance theorythat reproduced the rise and fall of online communities
and that clarified their general characteristics, such as the
power distribution of postings and the elimination of irrational
strategies.
The simulation results indicate two types of communi-
ties that will grow large: Topic-type and FreeTopic-type.
However, both types of communities have different decline
processes. Topic-type communities continue for a long time
after they peak, even though they crash relatively frequently.
We also investigated the evolution mechanism of Topic-type
and FreeTopic-type communities.
The Topic-type communities contain many agents who
have selfish strategies. Also, the opinions in postings are not
disproportionately positive or negative. In such communities,
the ratio of selfish strategies is higher than in FreeTopic-type
community. This causes the highly frequent crashes. However,
despite these crashes, there is a continuously large number of
postings after the peak (Fig.10). In such communities, agents
gain many benefits on average (Fig.15) and strategies are
highly diverse (Fig.13). After a crash occurs, a relatively large
number of agents gain benefits from the community.
On the other hand, FreeTopic-type communities contain
a strong cluster of agents who share the same strategy. In
this situation, even though the topic changes at each step
dynamically, the opinions in postings are disproportionately
positive or negative. The mechanism of this phenomenon can
be explained by group adaptation to a community in a situation
in which topic dynamically changes at each step. In such a
community, the opinion of the post deviates towards being
either positive of negative. Therefore, agents gain benefits
stably. Accordingly, the community does not often crash.
However, in such communities, the average benefit for an
agent is low, because agents greatly consider the balance
between each other rather than their topic preferences.
The simulation results can explain some phenomena that
appear in real online communities. For example, on Facebook,
the topics change dynamically and positive postings are more
likely than negative posts to spread [12]. The simulation results
indicated that such a community can be composed of negative
postings. The Like button of Facebook could be considered to
lead the user to positive postings. It is still doubtful whether
Facebook would be composed of negative posting even if there
were a ”Don’t Like” button.
In this research, we clarified the mechanism of the rise and
fall of online communities, especially focusing on the transi-
tion of topic. We found how communities decline and what
conditions will decrease the probability of crash. However, we
still do not know what conditions are sufficient for a crash,
and these conditions are required to formulate indicators of
an online community’s decline. We plan to analyze this in the
future.
Furthermore, the model we proposed is suitable for eval-
uating resilience under some different condition because the
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model can treat the relationship between users. For example,
estimating the effect of the users who attack the community
is important for considering how to improve the resilience of
a community. In addition to this, the following factors are
expected to be significant for estimating the rise and fall of
communities.
 Setting the number of topics above two
 Setting the link between the agents to negative.
 Changing the initial conditions of distribution of user
strategy
 Introducing stubbornness to each agent
 Introducing the symmetry bias of positive and negative
postings to each agent
The final goal of this work is to provide the foundations for
analyzing and predicting the behavior of agents in each kind of
online community. We will simulate the online communities
with the above extensions and confirm their consistency with
data of real online communities.
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